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Abstract
Using Pierre Bourdieu’s concept of "field", this essay assumes that there was no single "Church position"
during Portugal's dynastic crisis of 1578-81: Portugal's Church was an institution encompassing a large
number  of different agencies, each containing a huge number  of very  different agents  (from a social,
cultural,  economic  and even religious  perspective)  struggling for  power  and influence and disputing
control over material, spiritual and symbolic goods.
Therefore, my purpose is to explain the various and changing ways that the different prelates of Portugal's
thirteen mainland dioceses responded to the acute political problem of the royal succession between 1578
and 1581, and how the crown candidates tried to obtain their support.
Keywords
Church History, Bishops, Portuguese dynastic crisis of 1580, Political history, Religious ‘field’
Resumo
Partindo do conceito de "campo" tal  como formulado por  Pierre Bourdieu, este estudo assume que não
existiu uma posição unitária da Igreja no agitado processo político que marcou a vida portuguesa nos
anos  da crise dinástica (1578-1581).  A Igreja portuguesa era uma instituição constituída por  várias
instâncias e organismos, englobando diferentes agentes, tanto do ponto de vista social, como económico,
cultural e até religioso, os quais lutavam por poder e influência e disputavam a posse de bens materiais,
espirituais e simbólicos.
Em face desta perspectiva, a intenção central  da análise aqui apresentada é explicar  como é que cada
um dos  bispos  que ocuparam as  13 dioceses  do reino de Portugal  se posicionaram e actuaram no
contexto da vida política portuguesa, entre 1578 e 1581, e como é que os  candidatos  à sucessão da
Coroa portuguesa em 1580 tentaram obter o seu apoio
Palavras-chave




Although recent Portuguese historiography on the early modern period has rarely emphasized the
importance of  the political activities undertaken by bishops,  it  is commonly acknowledged that
they were deeply engaged in politics throughout the sixteenth century. Some prelates even played
leading roles in the political decision-making process, through their presence at the king’s court
(which was gradually becoming the center of Portugal’s political arena), through the seats they
occupied in such central councils and tribunals of the monarchy as the Royal Council, Council of
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State, Mesa da Consciência e Ordens,1 and Desembargo do Paço,2 and through their writings or
sermons.
The high cultural level and academic training that some of them possessed, the religious prestige
and symbolical  importance of  their  episcopal  functions,  the effectiveness  of  their  episcopal
bureaucratic apparatus and the territorialisation of their power, the deep interpenetration between
politics and theology (some authors even use the expression ‘political theology’ to describe it) – all
these things made them a very important elite. Consequently, monarchs were perfectly aware of
the importance of the Church, and particularly the bishops who occupied the leading positions in
the ecclesiastical  hierarchy,  in reinforcing royal  authority  within their  realm.  The concept  of
confessionalization,  proposed  by  Heinz  Schilling  (Schilling  2001),  and  the  notion  of  social
disciplining applied by Wolfgang Reinhard and Paolo Prodi (Reinhard 1994 and Prodi 1994) are
generally very useful for understanding the key role played by the Church in early modern politics
and state-building processes.
In the light  of  these considerations,  it  seems useful to analyze episcopal behavior during the
Portuguese political crisis of 1580. Yet this topic has seldom received extensive attention from
historians studying the Portuguese dynastic crisis which followed the death of King Sebastião on
4 August 1578. Excluding Queiroz Velloso, who briefly mentioned it in a book published exactly
sixty  years ago (Velloso 1946:  172-173),  and more recently  Fernando Bouza Alvarez (Bouza
Alvarez 1987),  most  historians dealing with this question have restricted their remarks to brief
considerations about  the role of  the Church in general,  ignoring the individual position of  each
specific bishop. Conversely, a few studies have been concerned only with the particular attitudes
of individual bishops; for example, Bartolomeu dos Mártires, the famous archbishop of Braga, or
Jerónimo Osório, bishop of Algarve (Rolo 1964, Serrão 1964 and Pinho 1993).
The classical and dominant thesis argues that the Portuguese Church was split in 1580. What is
usually called the upper clergy (bishops and prelates governing major religious orders - with the
exception of the Jesuits) tended from the beginning to support Philip II, the king of Castile, based
on the notion that for both economic and religious purposes, he offered the best solution for the
kingdom.  However,  the majority  of  the clergy,  socially  recruited from  amongst  non-nobles,
strongly  opposed the solution of  a foreign king wearing the crown of  Portugal and tended to
adhere to D.  António,  the Prior of  Crato,  an illegitimate son of  the infant  D.  Luís  (see,  for
example, Godinho 1978: 383-384; Marques 1986: 42-43 and Polónia 2005: 224-225).
João Marques made some effort to justify and explain the attitudes of the upper clergy. According
to him,  the support  they gave to Philip II  arose from several causes:  their family ties to the
nobility  (a  social  group  that  largely  preferred  Philip  II);  their  fear  of  social  and  religious
transformations; their general conservatism; pressure on them from agents of the king of Spain;
and especially  due to the advantages  they  hoped to gain by  supporting the most  powerful
candidate to the crown, simultaneously perceived as the ‘Catholic king’ and the greatest defender
of  the Catholic  religion,  threatened at  that  time by  both Protestant  heretics  and the Turks
(Marques 1986: 43).
More recently, Fernando Bouza has argued that if it is beyond any doubt that the lower clergy in
general opposed the idea of a foreign king, and issued propaganda all over the country, especially
from the pulpits, against the Habsburg monarch, with widespread acceptance of a popular state
(a topic very well studied by João Marques in 1986), it is no longer sustainable that bishops were
strongly engaged as a group in defense of Philip II’s candidacy. Bouza demonstrated that during
the dynastic crisis, although the Portuguese bishops never strongly opposed Philip II’s candidacy
(excluding the unique case of the bishop of Guarda, who always supported the Prior of Crato),
they were not open and enthusiastic supporters of it.  They only changed their positions after a
difficult  set  of  negotiations,  undertaken by  Cristóvão de Moura and Pedro Girón,  Duke of
Ossuna,  assured them that  the Castilian monarch would preserve all  the privileges  that  the
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Portuguese Church had enjoyed before 1580.  Bouza thus  implies  that  an historical  process
occurred, during which the episcopal position underwent a transformation (Bouza Alvarez 1987,
II, 558-569 and 579-590;Bouza Alvarez 2005: 118-120).
All the above-mentioned studies, even if some of them tried to distinguish positions assumed by
particular bishops, take for granted that it is possible to define a general position sustained by the
Portuguese church hierarchy during this complex political process, corresponding to the attitudes
expressed by the majority of its bishops. A good example of this methodological approach is an
essay  by  Jacinto  Monteiro  entitled  The attitude of  the  Church and the loss  of  Portugal’s
independence in 1580 (A  atitude da Igreja e a perda da independência de Portugal em 1580)
(Monteiro 1965).
I suggest, however, that it  is impossible to understand this process correctly by assuming that
there was any single “Church position”,  and that  it  resulted from some common point  of  view
shared by all bishops, acting as a group representing its corporate interests. Firstly, it  is worth
remembering that the Portuguese Church had no institution or agency where its general position
could be debated and afterwards  presented as  a collectively-agreed,  institutional  policy.  The
political assemblies of Portugal’s three different social estates (including the clergy) known as the
Cortes did not function in that way. Secondly, they lacked consensual positions on almost every
major issue; the concept of “field” (Bourdieu 1971; Bethencourt 1984) applies here, because the
Portuguese Church was an institution encompassing a large number of different agencies, each
containing a huge number of  very different  agents (from a social,  cultural,  economic and even
religious  viewpoint)  which fought  for power and influence,  disputing control  over innumerable
material,  spiritual and symbolic goods. One implication of  this approach is that,  within what  is
usually  called  "the  Church"  (in  the  singular),  there  co-existed  very  different  strategies  and
interests among the various institutions, agents and groups that comprised it.
Periods of deep rupture, during which tensions emerge more obviously, provide good moments for
testing  this  assumption.  The  Portuguese  political  crisis  of  1580  is  one  such  privileged
conjuncture. Accordingly, this essay will try to detect and explain the ways in which the different
individuals who were prelates of  Portuguese dioceses in the years from 1578-1581 faced the
acute political problem of the royal succession, and how the crown candidates, particularly the
one who ultimately won the prize - Philip II, tried to obtain their support.
1. The problem
On 4 August  1578,  the young and unmarried king of  Portugal,  D.  Sebastião,  died on the
battlefield of  Alcácer-Quibir in North Africa.  With him perished a large number of  Portuguese,
including some distinguished members  of  the nobility  and clergy,  in particular the bishops  of
Coimbra (Manuel de Meneses) and Oporto (Aires da Silva). The monarch’s journey to Africa was
disastrous  from every  perspective,  and it  aggravated the already  very  difficult  economic  and
budgetary situation of his kingdom. Worse still, it opened up the prospect of a dynastic crisis.
D.  Sebastião had neither sons  nor brothers;  therefore,  the crown was  assumed by  his  only
great-uncle who was still alive: D. Henrique, the son of D. Manuel I and brother of the former king
D. João III, was already 66 years old and a cleric, cardinal, and papal legate; for much of his life,
he had also been Portugal’s Inquisitor-General (Inquisidor geral). The danger of the extinction of
the ruling dynasty after his imminent death was obvious to everyone.
From the beginning of his reign, all the efforts of D. Henrique as king were directed towards three
main targets:  the punishment  of  those Portuguese who had encouraged D.  Sebastião’s highly
dangerous intention of fighting in Africa; ransoming the vast number (c. 10.000) of Portuguese
still captive in Africa; and preparing for his succession (Polónia 2005: 194-213). Although he was
a very old and devout  churchman,  a cardinal and the former archbishop of  Braga,  Évora and
Lisbon (Portugal’s three most prestigious cathedrals), his first step towards resolving the dynastic
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crisis was an attempt to get married. This intention was already evident in a letter he wrote to
Philip II  on 24 September 1578 (Brandão 1943:  21-22).  But  this  plan was foiled by Castilian
diplomacy  in Rome,  preventing the Pope from sending the necessary  brief  of  dispensation
(Velloso 1946: 98-129).
After September 1578, the succession debate and the consequent political dispute intensified at
the center of Portuguese politics. Among six leading candidates for the throne after the cardinal-
king’s death, the great majority boasted blood ties to D. Manuel I, king of Portugal in its golden
age between 1495 and 1521. These claimants were D. Catarina, duchess of Bragança, Portugal’s
most distinguished noble house, who was the daughter of D. Duarte, one of the youngest sons of
D. Manuel I; D. António, the Prior of Crato, a bastard of D. Luís, another son of D. Manuel I;
Philip II, king of Spain, son of Charles V and Isabel, the elder daughter of D. Manuel I; Emanuele
Filiberto, duke of Savoy, son of a younger daughter of D. Manuel I; Ranuccio Farnese, duke of
Parma,  a nephew of  the already-mentioned son of  D.  Manuel  I,  D.  Duarte;  and finally,  the
widowed queen of France, Catherine de’ Medici, who claimed very remote links to a thirteenth-
century Portuguese king, Afonso III.
The strongest claimants were D. Catarina of Bragança, the Prior of Crato, and Philip II. From a
juridical point  of  view,  as  has  been very  well  demonstrated (Cunha 1993),  the situation was
indeed complex. This is not the place to discuss further the advantages and handicaps of each
one, but there is no doubt that all three could invoke legitimate succession rights after the death
of D. Henrique.
The difficulties went far beyond juridical and genealogical disputes; the general framework was
extremely complex. Apart from a general sense of decadence that can be easily perceived in the
literature of  the period,  Vitorino Magalhães Godinho emphasized the difficulties of  Portuguese
international trade and the ensuing economic and financial consequences which had provoked a
crisis  since the middle of  the century  (Godinho 1978:  25-26,  381-382).  The external support
sought by D. Catarina and D. António from Spain’s great rivals, France and England, provoked
distrust among large sectors of the population, particularly from some ecclesiastics who feared
that  Protestant  heresies could be disseminated in Portugal through such future allies.  On the
other hand, a majority of people strongly opposed the introduction of a foreign king such as Philip
II. Their opposition was not a matter of nationalism, such as the concept came to be developed
during the nineteenth century,  but  there was  evidently  an atavistic  reaction to the idea of  a
non-native king. There was also the specter of armed conflict among groups supporting the three
strongest parties, a conflict that some sectors defended as the only way to prevent the kingdom
from falling under the control of a foreigner.
Moreover, all the candidates used the best means at their disposal to defend their cause: political
propaganda;  support  from the best  jurists  and theologians;  the search for  external  alliances
(including the papacy); the preparation of military campaigns; and the activity of foreign agents
attempting to acquire influence and supporters and to obtain information about decisions affecting
the succession. One consequence was the emergence of political factions supporting each of the
candidates.  As a final solution was postponed,  it  became more difficult  to reach a consensus
among all  the  parties  involved  in  the  dispute.  As  Francisco  Bethencourt  has  argued,  the
indecision of D. Henrique, who, after the marriage solution had failed, initially seemed to prefer D.
Catarina, but Henrique changed his mind after October 1579 and sought a negotiated agreement
with Philip II,  causing him to lose control of the political and social conflict (Bethencourt 1993:
549).
Such waffling made it  clear how difficult  the task facing D.  Henrique was and why,  from the
beginning, he sought some legally- based solution to avoid a war between Christians that would
destroy his realm.  However,  because the situation was so complex,  he took no final decision
before he died on 31 January 1580.
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2. In search of a peaceful solution
In his search for a juridically sustainable agreement that could prevent a war, one of the most
important steps taken by D. Henrique was to summon the Cortes.  Previously, on 11 February
1579, he had addressed a letter to all the candidates, demanding from them a demonstration of
their claim to the crown. The solemn opening of the assembly took place soon afterwards, on 1
April 1579.
According to Queiroz  Velloso,  this  meeting had three main purposes:  to obtain support  for
sending a special  ambassador to the Pope,  demanding his  approval  for  the marriage of  D.
Henrique (a wish still being blocked in Rome); to create a council of five governors, chosen by D.
Henrique from a group of 15 nobleman elected by the Cortes, who would govern the kingdom if
the monarch died before a consensus was reached concerning the succession;  and to elect  a
tribunal of 11 judges to decide, on a strictly juridical basis, who was the most legitimate candidate
to become king. Finally, all three estates represented in the Cortes should swear to recognize and
respect the decision taken by the governors in case D. Henrique died before any final solution
was reached (Velloso 1946: 205-209).
On 1 June, representatives of all three estates swore to respect any future decisions taken by
the governors and judges and also to fight, with weapons if necessary, in the event of any of the
candidates trying to obtain the crown through illicit means.
At  this key moment in the political process surrounding the succession,  let  us try to perceive
what position the bishops adopted during the Cortes.
The first  thing to be noted is that half  of the bishops were not in Lisbon attending the Cortes,
preferring instead to remain in their dioceses. In April 1579, only eleven of the thirteen Portuguese
continental bishoprics  even had a prelate:  Bartolomeu dos Mártires  (Braga);  António Pinheiro
(Miranda, transferred to Leiria in November 1579); Simão de Sá Pereira (Lamego, transferred to
Oporto in November 1579);  Miguel de Castro (Viseu);  João de Portugal (Guarda);  Gaspar do
Casal (Leiria,  transferred to Coimbra in November 1579); Jorge de Almeida (Lisbon); André de
Noronha (Portalegre); Teotónio de Bragança (Évora); António Mendes de Carvalho (Elvas); and
Jerónimo Osório (Algarve). The Oporto and Coimbra bishoprics remained vacant. According to
José de Castro, five of these eleven prelates (Mártires, Pinheiro, Portugal, Noronha and Osório)
did not attend the assembly (Castro 1942: 140).
A Latin memoir, addressed to the Pope from the people of Lisbon in November 1579,3 suggested
that  the missing bishops were avoiding the Cortes  because they opposed the position of  the
Jesuits,  who were apparently  inclined towards D.  Catarina of  Bragança (as was also,  in this
phase, the king, D. Henrique). But it is also plausible to argue that at least some of them did not
attend because they were uncertain about whom to support and preferred not to become deeply
involved in the dispute.  This could be the case with Bartolomeu dos Mártires,  who adopted a
distant and very legalistic position throughout the crisis, and also with Osório.
The other three seemed to have preferred a different  solution.  Pinheiro and Noronha favored
Philip II. In June 1579, Philip II already knew about the inclination of the bishop of Miranda and
wrote him a letter to be delivered by his ambassadors in Portugal, Cristóvão de Moura and the
Duke of Ossuna, recommending that his two agents tell the bishop that he would never regret
helping the Castilian side (Velloso 1946:  172).  This opinion was subsequently confirmed when
Moura wrote to Madrid in December 1579: “About António Pinheiro, we can have confidence (...)
he was at my house today and told me that he will punish a friar who preached against Castile
last Sunday at Santarém” (Velloso 1946: 348-349).
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The bishop of Portalegre was a cousin of Manuel de Noronha, fifth Marquis of Vila Real, who was
already engaged on Philip II’s side in February 1579. Naturally, the bishop followed his prominent
kinsman (Velloso 1946: 149).
João de Portugal,  the bishop of Guarda, was one of the leading supporters of D. António, the
Prior of  Crato.  Moura confirmed it  in a letter dated 14 April 1579 (Velloso 1946: 52).  Although
Moura often tried to convince him of the advantages of supporting Philip II, he never changed his
position (Velloso 1946: 173). João de Portugal’s position must be placed within the context of a
dispute with D.  Henrique dating from 1573.  The case has been well reconstructed by Carlos
Margaça Veiga:  as papal legate,  D.  Henrique had denounced his bad behavior as bishop and
caused a trial to be held against him at Rome. In order to ensure his best possible defense, João
de Portugal went to Rome. En route to the Vatican, he passed through Madrid, hoping to obtain
Philip II´s help. But,  warned by D. Henrique, the king of Spain refused him (Veiga 1995).  So,
João de Portugal had personal reasons for opposing Philip II, and of course, chose the candidate
whom D. Henrique hated most - his nephew, the Prior of Crato. In December 1578, the king had
even determined to banish D. António from Lisbon after learning about the steps the Prior was
taking to legitimize his origins and prove he was not a bastard.
By April 1579, D. Henrique presumably desired to arrange matters so that he could promote the
candidacy of Catarina of Bragança (although large sectors of the third estate opposed her) and
used the Cortes to gauge the mood of his realm. He expected to have support from a majority of
the bishops. And there is no doubt that some of them were his creatures, men who owed their
mitres to him. This is confirmed by a letter from the papal legate, Alessandro Frumenti, dated 19
May  1579,  informing the cardinal  of  Como that  most  of  the prelates  tended to support  D.
Catarina.4 He offered no names, but different sources make it plausible to presume that he meant
Teotónio de Bragança, Simão de Sá Pereira, Gaspar do Casal, Jorge de Almeida and António
Mendes de Carvalho.
The bishop of Evora, Teotónio de Bragança, was an uncle of D. Catarina and also maintained
close  relations  with  the  Jesuits  (Marques  1995:  263-268).  Philip  II  was  aware  of  the
Congregation’s initial support for D. Catarina, and tried to prevent it  at Rome. This he did with
some success: on 10 January 1579, the Jesuit  general Everardo Mercuriano wrote to Portugal
from  Rome,  prohibiting  any  direct  involvement  by  Society  members  in  Portugal’s  political
disputes.
Simão de Sá Pereira, a former member of the general council of the Holy Office, had very close
links with D.  Henrique,  as his promotion to the Oporto diocese in November 1579 illustrates.
Moreover, numerous references attest to his presence at key moments of the Lisbon Cortes, for
example at the ceremony where the city of Lisbon swore to obey the decisions of the Cortes,5
which presume his importance as a faithful royal agent.
Jorge de Almeida was also a man high in the confidence of D. Henrique. The cardinal-king had
chosen Almeida to replace him as  Inquisitor-general;  he had appointed him to the five-man
governing commission created from the Lisbon Cortes;  Almeida was  also a member of  the
special tribunal, created by papal authority and chaired by D. Henrique to assess the legitimacy of
the birth of the Prior of Crato, which declared D. António a bastard on 22 August 1579. Gaspar
do Casal was another member of this court,6 whose decision denied the Prior of Crato any legal
chance of  contending for the Portuguese crown.  In June 1579,  Moura tried to buy Almeida’s
support, suggesting he could become a cardinal by supporting Philip II. But Almeida coolly told
Moura that Portugal’s future king should be decided by the tribunal created in the Cortes (Velloso
1946: 247)
Finally, António Mendes de Carvalho also had close ties with the Jesuits. One of his biographers
claims he was made bishop by a very influential Jesuit, Martim Gonçalves da Câmara, during the
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reign of king D. Sebastião.7
So, the only bishop at the Lisbon Cortes supporting Philip II  was Miguel de Castro; so did the
former bishop of Viseu and head court chaplain (capelão mor), Jorge de Ataíde, though at this
time Ataíde kept his decision relatively secret (Velloso 1946: 145, 206). Miguel de Castro was a
noble from one of  the richest  and most  prestigious  families  in Évora.  His  elder brother was
Fernando de Castro,  an early supporter of  Philip II,  who rewarded him after becoming king of
Portugal by naming him Count of Basto. In fact, this entire clan supported Philip II as early as 7
February 1579, as Moura informed the king of Spain in a letter (Velloso 1946: 147-149).
The preceding details make it impossible to argue that the majority of Portuguese bishops held a
clearly  defined public  position by  April/June 1579,  and even more difficult  to claim that  they
already supported Philip II. Even among those bishops closest to D. Henrique, who was himself
little disposed to António, Prior of Crato, ambiguous positions seem to have been held. On 12
August  1579,  two months  after the Lisbon Cortes,  the Prior of  Crato sent  a letter to Pope
Gregory XIII,  begging him not  to give D.  Henrique the decision about  the legitimization of  his
birth. Documentary evidence indicates that D. António then believed in the impartiality of several
prelates, including D. Gaspar do Casal, Simão de Sá Pereira, and of course João de Portugal,
together with the former bishop of  Angra (Azores),  Manuel de Almada,  and Bartolomeu dos
Mártires, who had once briefly been his master.8
Much  evidence  from  this  period  suggests  the  continuous  evolution  and  transformation  of
Portugal’s political process.  By the beginning of  September 1579,  some signals had begun to
appear, suggesting a shift in position by D. Henrique (Veiga 1999: vol. 1, 344-346). He recognized
the impossibility of getting married, the antipathy of large sectors of the third estate towards D.
Catarina of Bragança, and, of course, he became increasingly persuaded of Philip II’s interest in
becoming king of Portugal and realized how difficult it would be to stop his power-play. By this
time,  he was  aware that  large sectors  of  the nobility  and even people within the restricted
membership of the royal councils were already compromised with Philip II. At the same time, he
wanted to prevent the Prior of Crato, who enjoyed great support from the popular estate, from
becoming the next  king of  Portugal.  Under these circumstances,  he began to think  the best
solution would be to strike a deal with Philip II,  if  only to avoid a war that  could destroy the
kingdom. All this became evident in the letters that Moura wrote to Madrid. On 18 September,
Moura reported that he had been told in a private meeting with the Cardinal King that D. Henrique
would soon take a final resolution favoring Philip II.  Six days later,  Moura sent Madrid a letter
from the cardinal with proposals for an agreement,  though D.  Henrique insisted that  any final
decision had to be confirmed by the Cortes.  In November,  D.  Henrique wrote to his niece D.
Catarina,  confirming that  he was  negotiating with Philip II.  Finally,  at  a meeting between D.
Henrique and Cristóvão de Moura on 10 November,  the main points  of  an agreement  were
reached. The deal had been negotiated mainly by Philip II’s ambassador and Miguel de Moura, a
member of D. Henrique’s privy council, who supported Philip II (Velloso 1946: 315-339).
With these basic ideas in mind, a very old and sick D. Henrique summoned another Cortes with
the hopeful expectation that all three estates would accept his proposals (Bouza 2005: 78-79).
One thing seems certain: confronted with so many conflicting interests, he did not want to make
an official decision by himself.
This Cortes opened at the small town of Almeirim on 11 January 1580. Once again,  only five
bishops definitely attended: Teotónio de Bragança (Évora); Jorge de Almeida (Lisbon); António
Pinheiro (Leiria);  Jerónimo de Meneses (Miranda) and Jerónimo Osório (Algarve).  We have no
information about three others: André de Noronha (Portalegre); Gaspar do Casal (the new bishop
of Coimbra); and António Mendes de Carvalho (Elvas). Bartolomeu dos Mártires acted as he had
done at the time of the Lisbon Cortes and once again avoided the center of the political arena. It
is  evident  that  he did not  want  to get  involved.  His silence meant  that  he would accept  any
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solution that was legally announced, but would not show any preference.
It is plausible that two of the missing bishops could justify their absence by the fact that they had
only been very recently nominated, and so should remain in their dioceses. Such was the case
with António Teles de Meneses (Lamego) and Simão de Sá Pereira (Oporto), both confirmed as
bishops in late November 1579 and both very close to D.  Henrique.  We have no evidence of
either man’s presence at Almeirim.
As for two others,  Miguel de Castro and João de Portugal,  both enthusiastic supporters of D.
António, Prior of Crato (who was at Santarém, a town very close to Almeirim), it is more difficult
to understand why they did not appear to defend their candidate.  However,  the position of  the
bishop of Guarda looks reasonable. His candidate had been declared a bastard by D. Henrique in
November 1579; hostile towards the Cardinal King, he must have concluded that his presence
among his episcopal colleagues would not be welcome. Prudently, he remained nearby, keeping
well-informed and helping those who defended D. António’s cause at Almeirim, while assisting D.
António’s numerous supporters in Santarém, the town where the third estate assembled during
the Cortes.
As to the five prelates in attendance at Almeirim, we are better informed.
Jerónimo de Meneses had decided in favor of Philip II even before becoming a bishop, although
his brother João Telo de Meneses, one of the five governors, supported D. Catarina – an unusual
family strategy.  But  the name of  the bishop of  Miranda appears on a list  of  people receiving
money from Cristóvão de Moura in 1579 (Velloso 1946: 171).
Teotónio de Bragança seemed still attached to his niece, D. Catarina. The papal nuncio informed
the Cardinal of Como on 21 January 1580 that D. Henrique was doing everything possible to be
replaced by Philip II  and therefore he had forbidden D.  Teotónio from speaking at  the clerical
meetings during the Almeirim Cortes, because of his family links with the house of Bragança.9A
few  days  later,  when D.  Catarina of  Bragança decided to visit  the dying Cardinal  King at
Almeirim,  Teotónio de Bragança was the only  bishop to give her and her entourage a public
welcome (Velloso 1946: 393).
Like his beloved patron D.  Henrique,  Jorge de Almeida was making every effort  to find some
solution that would prevent a war. But rumors circulated at Almeirim that he had sold his support
to  Castile.10  Nevertheless,  Almeida’s  future position,  especially  after  becoming a governor,
reveals that he was very hesitant.
The two most  important  actors  among the bishops  at  Almeirim were undoubtedly  Jerónimo
Osório and António Pinheiro.
Upon receiving the letter from D. Henrique summoning him to the new Cortes at Almeirim, Osório
replied in November 1579. Among other things, he begged D. Henrique to do everything possible
to avoid a disastrous war among Christians and advised the king not  to listen to anyone who
argued that war was the best way.11 His letter was used by Castilian propaganda to claim that
the prestigious bishop of Algarve supported Philip II (Velloso 1946: 365).
After reaching Almeirim on 4 January 1580, Osório wrote another letter to D. Henrique, containing
a very  clear,  pragmatic  and well-argued position.  With a large number of  candidates  who all
considered themselves legitimate, the best solution for the kingdom’s dangerous situation was to
form a union with Castile. Seeing no way to defend the realm if Philip II  decided to attack, he
argued that it was preferable to accept him peacefully than after the shame and oppression of a
military defeat. Finally, he argued that the best method involved negotiating the union of the two
crowns with Philip II  “under some honest  conditions” and concluded his  letter with the pithy
phrase, “subjugated never, united yes”.12
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According to Sebastião Tavares de Pinho, this letter from Osório finally persuaded the Cardinal
King to accept Philip II. Pinho used another open letter of the bishop of Algarve, written some
months later (July 1580) and known as Defensio sui nominis, to argue that (in Osório’s words),
“when the bishops were meeting with the clerical estate at Almeirim, the cardinal confessed to
him that he [Osório] will appreciate and defend the formula he will soon receive for resolving the
dynastic  crisis,”  implying that  this  formula was  a preliminary  agreement  with Philip II  to be
presented at the Cortes (Pinho 1993: 318-319). Though the position sustained by the bishop of
Algarve was undoubtedly very pragmatic and impressed some of his episcopal colleagues, Pinho
neglected the data used by Queiroz Velloso, demonstrating that D. Henrique had been moving in
this direction since September 1579.
António Pinheiro also seems to have played a very important role during this period. He had the
advantage of  being a very  experienced politician;  since the reign of  João III,  he had been a
respected courtier  who had often preached at  the most  important  monarchical  ceremonies.
Perhaps  because of  his  previous  experience,  D.  Henrique assigned him  the role of  broker
between the king and the popular estate in these crucial January days. We must also remember
that  D.  Henrique was  then very  ill  and near death;  under such circumstances,  he entrusted
António Pinheiro with delivering some of his most important decisions to the Cortes.
In view of  some hesitation on the part  of  D.  Henrique during the last  days of  December that
worried the Spanish ambassadors Moura and Ossuna, the cardinal probably intended to obtain
some general consensus at the Cortes that would allow him to make an acceptable compromise
declaring Philip II as his successor. According to Bouza, this was the strategy used by Philip II
throughout 1579: to negotiate some solution that defended his interests, relying on the skill of his
representatives in Portugal, and avoiding the necessity of using military force (Bouza 2005: 78).
And Pinheiro played a key role in defending Philip II’s interests during the Cortes. Three times the
cardinal sent him to talk to the popular estate.  Particularly on his second visit,  on 18 January
1580, he read a memorial, purporting to express D. Henrique’s ideas, which asserted that Philip
II’s claims were more consistent than those of D. Catarina and, accordingly,  that D. Henrique
expected that  it  was  possible for the realm to reach an agreement  with the King of  Castile
(Velloso 1946: 375-380). This statement was badly received by the third estate, provoking excited
and hostile reactions. Four days later,  the popular assembly decided that they preferred to die
rather than deliver the crown to a foreign king.
We must  pay  attention to two letters  in order to understand António Pinheiro’s  feelings  and
actions.  Firstly,  in a letter from Philip II  to Moura,  sent  from Madrid on 26 January,  the king
recognized his key role and asked Moura to aid him : “Bishop Piñero behaves in ways that show
well his favorable inclination for our affairs; therefore it is fitting that you show him my satisfaction
with his conduct and assure him that he will receive suitable rewards in gratitude for what I owe
him” (original in Velloso 1946: 382).  A second letter,  from the papal nuncio to Rome, dated 29
January, reported that António Pinheiro had told the popular estate that D. Henrique was about to
reach an agreement with Philip II; however, the nuncio commented that this was untrue and had
not  been  explicitly  ordered  by  the  cardinal.12  Together,  these  letters  suggest  that  rumors
circulated that António Pinheiro had privileged information from the Cardinal King but had twisted
it a little in order to favor, as much as possible, the interests of Philip II.
The third estate’s  vigorous  rejection of  any  suggestion of  a foreign king,  combined with the
division among the estate of nobility, where Philip II received only one more vote than either D.
Catarina or the Prior of Crato, effectively prevented D. Henrique from taking any final decision
before he died on 31 January 1580. His inability to proclaim any satisfactory solution contributed
to the creation of the historiographical myth that his hesitation delivered Portugal to the Spanish.
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3. From negotiation to war
Immediately after D. Henrique’s death, power was transferred to the five governors elected at the
Lisbon Cortes.  They were divided about the best solution to be taken, although they tended to
agree about choosing a king with the best dynastic claim from a juridical point of view. Basically,
the archbishop of  Lisbon hesitated about  supporting anyone.  João Telo de Meneses opposed
Philip II, while the other three (João de Mascarenhas, Francisco de Sá de Meneses and Diogo
Lopes de Sousa) supported the King of Spain (Veloso 1953: 4). Initially, given the obvious social
and political divisions in the realm - including among themselves - they merely tried to prevent
Philip II from launching a military invasion of Portugal. Accordingly, they sent a special embassy
to the Spanish court, formed by the Bishop of Coimbra, Gaspar do Casal, and Manuel de Melo
(Veiga 1999:  360-361).  Simultaneously,  in a letter dated 19 February 1580,  they asked Pope
Gregory XIII to urge Philip II not to use military force to conquer the Portuguese throne.14
The coming months were very confused and full of  political activity,  with different  centers  of
power emerging.
The governors, still split among themselves, preserved a general atmosphere of indecision while
trying to create conditions for respecting a juridical solution that would be confirmed through the
Cortes.  On 30 April 1580, they convoked them, although they were never formally summoned.
During this period, they apparently trusted the role bishops could play in preserving peace in their
dioceses and respecting the decisions taken by the governors. They even sent a circular letter to
all  prelates,  ordering them to encourage their  flocks  to be ready  to defend Portugal  against
anyone who tried to conquer its crown against their decisions, also asking them to be alert and
not to allow their clergy, especially during sermons, to take public positions in favor of any of the
candidates (Rolo 1964: 23).
Philip II tried to profit from the circumstance that Portugal’s three estates were still assembled at
Almeirim  (the  Cortes  were  not  closed immediately  after  D.  Henrique  died,  and were  only
suspended on 15 March) by offering them a solution based on the agreement he had negotiated
with the late king, including the various privileges among the different estates and also offering a
certain amount of autonomy to the kingdom. His position was made explicit in a document of 25
chapters, presented by Ossuna at Almeirim on 20 March 1580, entitled Memorial de las gracias y
mercedes que el Rey nuestro señor concederá a estos reynos quando fuere jurado rey y señor
dellos (…) (Bouza 2005: 69, 80-82).
At the same time, Philip II made it very clear that he considered himself the legitimate king of
Portugal.  This  was  clearly  demonstrated  in  the  first  days  of  April,  when he received the
representatives  sent  by  the governors  not  as  ambassadors,  but  as  vassals  -  a significant
difference, as some of the governors noticed (Veloso 1953: 41). But together with his one hand
wearing a velvet glove of peaceful and “generous” strategy, Philip II  showed an iron fist  in the
other by preparing troops for an invasion. On 20 May, for example,  the governors convoked a
Council of State to discuss a letter from the Spanish ambassador, in which Philip II declared that
if  he was not  declared monarch of  Portugal by 8 June,  he would invade the kingdom (Veloso
1953: 112).  In Portugal,  Cristóvão de Moura kept  trying to convince some notable Portuguese
figures to declare for Philip II and rewarded others by offering them privileges and even bribes. D.
Jorge de Ataíde,  the former bishop of  Viseu,  for  example,  was  offered an amount  of  one
thousand cruzados yearly, according to a letter dated 25 January 1580 that he kept among his
papers.15
Meanwhile,  D.  António,  Prior of  Crato,  had mustered considerable support,  especially  among
ordinary people. He simultaneously sought international help and tried to reopen the legal process
of legitimizing his birth. If he could only be declared legitimate, he would undoubtedly overtake all
http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Portuguese_Brazilian_Studies/ejph/html/issue8/html/jpaiva_main.html
rival candidates and be declared heir to the Portuguese crown. On 19 June 1580, stimulated by
the bishop of Guarda, João de Portugal, a group of his supporters at Santarém publicly acclaimed
him as the new king of Portugal. Four days later, he and his forces entered Lisbon, where he was
also received as king and began acting as Portugal’s new monarch (Veloso 1953: 151-153 and
Serrão 1956).
At this moment, the governors and the various supporters of Philip II around them (including the
bishop of Leiria, António Pinheiro, and the former bishop of Viseu, Jorge de Ataíde) escaped to
Setúbal, fifty kilometers south of Lisbon. A few days later, on 17 July, the three governors who
had clearly supported Philip II from the beginning, and now, pursued by the forces of D. António,
had fled from Setúbal, decided to declare Philip II King of Portugal.16
In this  whirlwind of  political  confusion,  only  D.  Catarina de Bragança,  aware of  her military
weakness but confident of her dynastic rights, still insisted on a juridical solution. On 20 June, her
husband insisted that the governors proclaim her as queen, because, by using force, both Philip II
and D. António had broken the agreement reached during the Lisbon Cortes (Veloso 1953: 158).
Throughout these six dramatic months, what was the attitude of the bishops? Once more, we
can find no homogeneous scenario. In February and March, some of them remained at Almeirim,
still one of the main centers of power, where Moura and Osuna kept trying to convince not only
the bishops but also other members of the nobility of the advantages of declaring Philip II king,
despite risking accusations of treason. As the nuncio informed Rome, a riot had occurred shortly
before 22 March, when they were assembled with the bishops.17
At  this  point,  it  became  particularly  evident  that  Philip  II  was  seeking  support  from  the
Portuguese episcopacy. This was one point in his strategy for conquering the Portuguese crown
by preventing preachers in particular, and the lower clergy in general, from using Portugal’s pulpits
against him.
According to Bouza (Bouza 2005:  112-113),  his  negotiations  with the bishops  were difficult
because, especially after a 1578 agreement between the clergy and the king D. Sebastião, the
privileges of the Church, and particularly its jurisdictional privileges, were enormous, far beyond
those existing in Spain.18 Philip’s official Memorial de las gracias y mercedes referred to Church
privileges in chapters 9,  10,  15 and 18.19 Basically,  it  said that  all bishops,  heads of  religious
orders, holders of church benefices subject to royal appointment, and the Inquisitor General were
positions that had to be given to Portuguese natives; that the king would not impose new taxes
on the Church and clergy,  like  the “terças,  subsidios  e  escusados”  levied in  Castile;  that
whenever the king was away from Portugal, he had to be accompanied by one clergyman and
another Portuguese who would form a council (Conselho de Portugal) to be consulted about all
Portuguese matters; finally, that, like previous kings of Portugal, the king would maintain a royal
chapel in Lisbon.  Following Bouza’s interpretation,  supported also by Federico Palomo,  it  was
only after these concessions that the Portuguese bishops accepted the union of the crowns of
Portugal and Spain (Bouza 1987: vol. 2, 580-581; Palomo 2004: 69-70).
I am, however, less sure about the decisive importance of these negotiations in persuading the
bishops. According to a letter from Almeirim dated 28 March, only António Pinheiro, bishop of
Leiria, Jerónimo de Meneses, bishop of Miranda, Teotónio de Bragança, archbishop of Évora, and
Jorge de Ataíde, the former bishop of Viseu were present at Almeirim when these arrangements
were discussed, and they confirmed their support of Philip II by acknowledging the “sacred zeal”
he had always shown when confronting the problem of  Portugal’s  dynastic  succession.20 As
shown above,  three of  them (Pinheiro,  Meneses,  and Ataíde) had already decided to support
Philip II  a long time before,  at  least  since March/April 1579,  and were not  particularly worried
about these negotiations. Moreover, other bishops who were probably not at Almeirim in March
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1580, for example Miguel de Castro (Viseu), Jerónimo Osório (Algarve) and André de Noronha
(Elvas), did not wait for these concessions to the clergy before declaring their support for the king
of Spain. As we have seen, Osório’s letter of  4 January 1580 invoked reasons other than the
privileges conceded to the Church for giving his support to Philip II. On 11 June, Osório wrote to
Philip II, boasting that he had done his best to defend him at Almeirim and was still continuously
doing so in his  diocese.  He again acknowledged his  prudent  support  for the king of  Castile,
recognizing that Philip II could easily conquer Portugal by force, but praising him for preferring to
act more as a father than as an "imperial lord".21
So, I accept that negotiation remained an important strategic element in Philip II’s policy, but it
was not decisive for convincing most bishops, except Teotónio de Bragança and perhaps Gaspar
do Casal. According to our available information, the Archbishop of Evora changed his position
between late January  and March 1580;  until  then he had remained loyal  to his  relative,  D.
Catarina, but by the end of March he was on Philip II’s side. Yet he had apparently decided to
support  the king of  Castile even before Moura and Ossuna produced the so-called Mercês de
Almeirim. He started a letter dated 3 March 1580 complimenting Philip II on the birth of a new
daughter, by declaring that he was ‘always ready to serve’ Philip II.22
We have little information about the attitude of Gaspar do Casal before March 1580, although he
was  generally  in sympathy  with D.  Henrique.  So it  seems plausible that  he was  inclined to
support Philip II by January 1580, if still slightly hesitant. In any event, there is no doubt that by
April he was supporting the king of Castile.23
Other bishops maintained an ambiguous or non-explicit position between February and July. One
was the archbishop of Lisbon and also one of the governors, Jorge de Almeida. Apparently his
conduct resembled that of D. Henrique, the former king. Some of his actions reveal support for
Philip II. The best example is his opposition to reopening the procedure legitimizing D. António.
As one of the judges at the first inquest into legitimizing D. António, carried out while D. Henrique
was alive, he was pressed by the papal nuncio between March and June 1580 to reopen it. But
Almeida blocked all attempts to do so, and no new legitimization procedure was ever begun by a
new tribunal (Castro 1942: 104-106). Throughout these months, Almeida often met with Cristóvão
de Moura. At one of them, in early May, he promised Moura that, as Inquisitor General, he would
punish a friar who had preached a sermon claiming that any Portuguese who died fighting against
Philip II’s troops would enter Paradise (Veloso 1953: 76). In any event, like the Cardinal King, he
was afraid of  a war;  in June, exactly one day before D. António was acclaimed at  Santarém,
Almeida was still begging Moura to give him more time to summon the Cortes and have a final
and consensual solution approved there (Veloso 1953:142-143).
Another prelate who never revealed an explicit position was the Archbishop of Braga, Bartolomeu
dos Mártires. It appears that he too was primarily concerned with shaping some juridical solution
that would prevent a war between partisans of D. António and Philip II, and therefore remained
officially  neutral.  That  is  how I  prefer to interpret  his  absence from all the Cortes,  his  public
silence about the succession issue after August 1578, and also the position he took in a pastoral
letter  promulgated on 11 May  1580,  after  receiving the order  sent  by  the governors  to all
Portuguese prelates.  His  pastoral  letter  makes  it  very  clear  that  his  main intention was  to
maintain peace (he even ordered all good Christians to make prayers and processions for its
promotion), together with a neutral position and respect for all decisions made by duly constituted
public officials, i.e. the five governors.24 The heated controversies of forty years earlier, debating
whether this famous archbishop’s attitudes reveal him as a patriot  trying to prevent  the realm
from being handed to Philip II  (Rolo 1964),  or blaming him as  someone whose silence and
hesitation made him indirectly responsible for Philip II’s triumph (Serrão 1964), make no sense at
all.
Finally, we must recognize that the two bishops who were most active politically throughout the
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succession crisis (excluding Jorge de Almeida, who was a governor) were António Pinheiro and
João de Portugal. The first consistently promoted Philip II’s candidacy; the second masterminded
D. António’s strategy.
Pinheiro defended Castilian interests in the Council of State, for example in late March, when he
opposed  the  decision  that  the  governors  were  about  to  take  concerning  the  necessity  of
summoning a new Cortes to declare who should be king. He seems to have always been well
informed about the measures Philip II was planning. For example, on May 2, Moura told him that
Philip II  had obtained declarations from Spanish theologians, clarifying his right to make war in
order  to  defend  his  legitimate  rights  (Veloso  1953:  60).  And  Pinheiro  frequently  displayed
agreement  with policies followed by Castile.  Fernando Bouza found two very important  letters
from  him  that  confirm  this  interpretation.  In  the first,  the bishop of  Leiria  argued that  the
Portuguese were so individualistic that  it  was better to persuade them to support  Philip II  by
offering individual rewards rather than general privileges. In the second, dated March 1580, when
the necessity of  using military force became increasingly evident,  Pinheiro said that  those (he
called them “evil  men”) who refused the rewards  and privileges  offered by  Philip II  must  be
convinced by the “hammer of  fear” (Bouza 2005:  75,  78).  His explicit  and public engagement
explain why, after D. António entered Lisbon in July, he had to flee, together with Jorge de Ataíde
the former bishop of Viseu. And, as the papal nuncio informed Rome, both men’s lives and honor
were at risk on that occasion.26
On the opposite side emerged the equally prominent role of João de Portugal. His position was
very well known to the alert Cristóvão de Moura; in a letter to Philip II in April, Moura reported
that the bishop, his brother Manuel de Portugal, the governor João Telo de Meneses, the Jesuit
Martim Gonçalves da Câmara and Febo Moniz were the king of Spain’s worst enemies (Veloso
1953: 74). By the end of May, Moura knew about the meetings held at Santarém, at which the
bishop and his friends had hatched their conspiracies (Veloso 1953: 148).
Finally,  it  was João de Portugal,  who on Sunday 18 June,  after mass,  proclaimed in a very
enthusiastic  speech to a large audience that  D.  António was the only Portuguese capable of
preventing Portugal,  with God’s mercy, from falling into Spanish hands. So, he concluded, our
only hope was to proclaim the Prior of Crato as defender of the realm, and assist him in a spirit of
resistance and sacrifice (Serrão 1956: 16-17). After D. António’s uprising, during the few weeks
when he managed to act like a king in Lisbon, the papal nuncio considered the bishop of Guarda
one of the most powerful people in the “new state”.27
He paid heavily for it. Philip II showed him no pity. In April 1585, a court presided over by Pedro
de Castilho,  the former bishop of  Angra (Azores) and loyal to Philip II,  deprived him of  his
bishopric,  his  priestly  rank,  and every  ecclesiastical  benefice  he possessed.  He was  also
denaturalized and sentenced to prison for life in a monastery in Spain,  where he died (Castro
1942: 359-362).
4. The final assault
After D.  António’s uprising on 18 June at  Santarém, followed by his entry into Lisbon,  where
Manuel de Almada, another former bishop of Angra, also supported him (Serrão 1956: 45), Philip
II had no other choice than to invade Portugal with his army. On 18 June (the same day as the
uprising at  Santarém),  the border towns  of  Campo Maior and Elvas  surrendered to Philip II
without fighting. At Elvas, an agreement was made with the approval of the local bishop, António
Mendes de Carvalho (Veloso 1953: 159-160). On 28 June, commanded by the renowned Duke of
Alba, Philip II’s infantry crossed the Portuguese border and headed in the direction of Lisbon. En
route, on 25 August, at a place called Alcântara, Philip II’s troops routed the outnumbered and
under-prepared forces of D. António, who managed to escape towards northern Portugal during
the battle. This result explains why Philip II, after this lengthy process, considered that he had
simultaneously inherited, purchased, and conquered the kingdom of Portugal (Serrão 2001: 80).
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Only after the battle of  Alcântara was the question of  the Portuguese succession definitively
decided. However, from a legal viewpoint, the proclamation of Castro Marim, made on 17 July by
three of the five governors, officially transformed the monarch of Castile into the King of Portugal.
The king’s formal acclamation occurred several months later, at a session of the Cortes held at
the town of Tomar in April 1581.
After the battle of Alcântara, all the bishops (except of course João de Portugal), including those
who until  then had remained hesitant  or neutral,  like D.  Jorge de Almeida,  Bartolomeu dos
Mártires or Simão de Sá Pereira, rapidly showed their support for the new king. And all of them
attended the Cortes of Tomar in April 1581, except Jerónimo Osório, the bishop of Algarve, who
had died on 20 August  1580.  At  the Cortes,  António Pinheiro,  of  course,  gave the opening
speech (Bouza Alvarez 1987: vol. 1 218-220, and Serrão 1956: 215-216).
We have abundant  proof  of  the open and rapid support  given by  the bishops  to Philip II.
Chronologically, the first is a letter from the Bishop of Portalegre, André de Noronha, dated 29
August,  in which he vividly  congratulates  the new king on the “reduction of  Lisbon to His
Majesty’s service”.27 One month before this, he had opposed the acclamation of D. António at
Portalegre.28 But from a rhetorical point of view, the most interesting letter was the one written
by the Bishop of  Miranda,  Jerónimo de Meneses,  in December 1580.  No one else expressed
such flattery  towards  the new king.29 At  Viseu,  as  expected,  Bishop Miguel de Castro also
played an important role in proclaiming Philip II as the new king in the first days of September,
despite some local resistance.30
Even those bishops who had not openly declared themselves before August now supported Philip
II.
On 9 September, Jorge de Almeida, Archbishop of Lisbon, finally ended his indecision and wrote
to Gabriel Zaias, a secretary of Philip II,  expressing his desire to visit the new king personally
and kiss his hand.31 His visit was postponed at Philip’s orders, despite the continuous insistence
of the archbishop to do so.32
Another archbishop, Bartolomeu dos Mártires, who had refused to proclaim D. António in August,
despite pressure from some inhabitants  of  Braga which had forced him to abandon his  seat
briefly, decided to proclaim Philip II as king, at the town where he was archbishop and lord, on
the first of September. Two days earlier, he had written to Garcia Sarmiento de Sotomayor, a
Castilian general, saying that because he opposed D. António some people from Braga had tried
to kill him and that his intention had always been to preserve justice (Serrão 1964: 268-269). And,
on 11 November,  answering a letter from Philip II,  he reassured the new ruler that  he would
persecute and punish any cleric who had been loyal to D. António during the crisis.33
At Oporto, Simão de Sá Pereira - who always kept in close touch with his neighbor Bartolomeu
dos Mártires, including when both had been forced to flee from their towns under pressure from
D.  António’s  forces  - showed his  subordination to the new king’s  orders  in letters  written in
December.34
During the coming years,  recognizing the help he had received and purporting to show his
gratitude,  Philip II  promoted some of  the bishops  who had supported him during these two
dramatic years. As one would expect, António Pinheiro received important and lucrative offices in
the new Portuguese administration (Veiga 1999:  vol.  1 392),  as did D.  Jorge de Ataíde who
remained as head court  chaplain and in December 1580 was made President  of  the Mesa da
Consciência.35 Miguel de Castro, the Bishop of Viseu, was made archbishop of Lisbon and later
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became one of the kingdom’s governors. André de Noronha, Bishop of Portalegre, was promoted
to the Spanish bishopric  of  Plasencia,  while Jerónimo de Meneses was transferred from the
impoverished diocese of  Miranda to  wealthier  Oporto.  Other  prelates  from  the Portuguese
overseas empire who supported Philip II were also promoted. As I have demonstrated elsewhere,
it  was during his government  that  we find the highest  number of  bishops already serving the
previous king being promoted (Paiva 2006).
Such developments led Federico Palomo to conclude that  during the first  years of  Philip II’s
government as king of Portugal, and relying on the agreements preserving the privileges of the
Portuguese  Church  (presented  at  Almeirim  and  confirmed  at  the  Cortes  held  in  Tomar),
Portugal’s episcopate offered no opposition to the new king and indeed acted as very important
allies who contributed to the consolidation and legitimization of the new monarch’s rule (Palomo
2004: 78-80). But this period is part of another story.
 
Conclusions
For purposes  of  clarity  and objectivity,  I  offer  my  conclusions  in the form of  six  summary
statements.
1 – It  is  no longer possible to assert  that  there was  some uniform position taken by  “the
Portuguese Church”  during Portugal’s  dynastic  crisis  of  1578-1581.  Even assuming that  its
bishops  represented the Portuguese Church,  this  study  makes  it  clear  that  the Portuguese
episcopate had no single consensual position. Thirteen different mainland bishops played different
roles at different times. The `field’ of Portuguese clergy, including its bishops, remained deeply
divided over this vital issue.
2 – Episcopal attitudes evolved continuously throughout this crisis. The general tendency reveals
that, over time, an increasing number of prelates supported Philip II, although a majority of them
preferred Catarina de Bragança until May/June 1579. In any event, the time at which each chose
to declare or act as a supporter of Philip II differed from bishop to bishop.
3 – In general,  bishops kept a very low strategic profile about intervening at the center of this
political dispute. Although a few of them (António Pinheiro, bishop of Miranda and Leiria; Jorge de
Ataíde,  former bishop of  Viseu,  João de Bragança,  bishop of  Guarda;  and Jorge de Almeida,
archbishop of  Lisbon) played particularly  active and decisive roles,  most  preferred to remain
prudent in their support of the various candidates.
4 – We still have no overview of the real impact and importance of Portugal’s episcopate at a
diocesan level; but their collective proceedings at the Cortes or individual dealings with agents of
Portugal’s political center make it clear that every important candidate for the throne sought their
support, implying that the candidates were aware and convinced of their importance.
5 – Insofar as we can find any governing logic behind the positions assumed by the Portuguese
episcopacy,  it  seems that  a majority  acted in defense of  their personal,  family  and clientage
interests, revealing an acute sense of opportunism. However, within this individualistic framework,
four  main  reasons  emerge  to  help  explain  their  attitudes  and  motivations:  a)  preserving
Catholicism in Portugal;  b) preserving the privileges of  the Portuguese Church and clergy;  c)
awareness that it was impossible to resist the power of Philip II; and d), the necessity of avoiding
war if possible.
6 – If Philip II became king of Portugal, a majority of Portuguese bishops ultimately contributed to
his success. And the new ruler crushed the only one who had vehemently opposed him.
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Notes
* I wish to thank my friend and American colleague William Monter  for  his assistance in improving the
English of my original draft.
1Council created in 1532 to advise the king on religious matters.
2Appellate tribunal with jurisdiction over criminal and civil justice.
3Archivio Segreto Vaticano [hereafter ASV], Segretaria di Stato, Portogallo, vol. 7, fol. 230.
4ASV - Segretaria di Stato, Portogallo, vol. 7, fl. 32.
5ASV - Segretaria di Stato, Portogallo, vol. 4, fl. 59.
6ASV - Segretaria di Stato, Portogallo, vol. 7, fols. 179-180.
7BACELAR, Manuel da Cunha de Andrade e Sousa -  Epítome historica e panegirica da vida, acçoens e
morte do Excellentissimo e reverendissimo Senhor Dom Antonio Mendes de Carvalho, primeiro bispo de
Elvas. Lisbon: Pedro Ferreira, 1753, p. 57-59.
8ASV - Segretaria di Stato, Portogallo, vol. 7, fols. 462-463.
9ASV - Segretaria di Stato, Portogallo, vol. 7, fl. 280.
10Idem.
11The letter  was first published by Baião 1951: 201-202. Pinho (1993: 311-313)  uses another  version,
which he claims is closer to Osório´s usual style from a formal point of view.
12The entire letter was published by Velloso 1946: 366-367.
13ASV - Segretaria di Stato, Portogallo, vol. 7, fl. 293.
14ASV - Segretaria di Stato, Portogallo, vol. 4, fols. 90-91.
15Biblioteca Nacional (Lisbon) – Pombalina 641, fl. 559.
16This document, known as the Proclamação de Castro Marim, was published by Veloso 1953: 175-179.
17ASV - Segretaria di Stato, Portogallo, vol. 7, fl. 373-375.
18The agreement of  18 March 1578 between D. Sebastião and the clergy  was  printed by  CASTRO,
Gabriel Pereira de - Monomachia sobre as concórdias que fizeram os reis com os prelados de Portugal
nas duvidas da jurisdição eclesiástica e temporal. Lisbon: José Francisco Mendes, 1738, pp. 228-256.
19I have used the copy in ASV, Segretaria di  Stato, Portogallo, vol. 7, fols. 367-368. See also (Bouza
Alvarez 1987: vol. 2, 956-957).
20Archivo General de Simancas [hereafter AGS], Estado, legajo 419, letter 136.
21AGS - Estado, legajo 419, letter 152.
22AGS - Estado, legajo 419, letter 170.
23AGS -  Estado, legajo 418, letter  57 (Reasons given by the bishop of Coimbra in support of Philip II’s
claim to the Portuguese crown).
24It was published by Rolo 1964: 23-24.
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25ASV - Segretaria di Stato, Portogallo, vol. 7, fl. 465v.
26ASV - Segretaria di Stato, Portogallo, vol. 7, fols. 469-470.
27AGS - Estado, legajo 418, letter 152.
28AGS - Estado, legajo 421, letter from Jerónimo de Mendonça, dated 29 June 1580.
29AGS - Estado, legajo 418, legajo 424, letter 127 and 128.
30AGS - Estado, legajo 421, letter dated 11 September 1580.
31AGS - Estado, legajo 419, letter 111.
32AGS - Estado, legajo 419, letter 120.
33AGS - Estado, legajo 419, letter 150.
34AGS - Estado, legajo 426, letter dated 13 December 1580.
35 Biblioteca Nacional (Lisbon) – Pombalina 641, fols. 543 and 545.
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